Recently, USA Today’s Thomas Frank wrote the eyebrow-raising feature story
Most Fake Bombs Missed by Screeners.

His article details the shocking findings that the majority of “fake bombs” and bomb-making parts were overlooked by TSA airport screeners.

Last week, Peter chatted—and wound up debating—with Tom Frank on this topic.

PG: Here’s one story that jumped off the front page. How many bombs did they miss?

TF: Well, first of all, they’re not bombs, they’re fake bombs. But the bomb components are real. In Los Angeles, they missed about 75 percent of the fake bombs that the testers tried to get through last year. And in Chicago O’Hare, about 60 percent.

That’s not a very good percentage.

It’s not. In San Francisco, however, they missed only about 20 percent. In San Francisco, they’ve got a slightly different scenario where they do constant testing. They’re constantly trying to get these fake bombs past the screeners, which makes them more alert.

I’ve actually sat at those desks and looked at those screen as items are going through on the conveyer belt. And I have to say, my hat’s off to those guys. After about seven minutes my eyes would glaze over and I’m asking for a price check on aisle five.

Well, one thing they do is rotate them every 30 minutes so that their eyes don’t go blurry. But you’re correct to acknowledge that’s not easy. The bombs, or the bomb components you’re looking for are often very small. It could be some wires, a fake detonator. It’s not an anti-tank round sitting in someone’s briefcase.

I’m assuming that the whole idea here is that a lot of these terrorists or would-be terrorists would want to put parts of a bomb in different parts of their bags so they can assemble it once they’re on the plane?

That’s exactly right. It’s IED technology. So, the same components that are being used to make roadside bombs in Iraq, it’s the same thing. Part of what the TSA wants to do is [find out] where are the weaknesses. What can be gotten in?

So we can presume from this that if you’re a terrorist, you have a better chance going through Los Angeles than San Francisco?

Not necessarily. The tests I reported on were done last year, so it could be different. You don’t know. The terrorists don’t like to play any odds lower than 100 percent. Even though you’ve got a 75 percent chance of getting something through—or they did a year ago—terrorists want higher odds than that.

The other day I was on a flight, and the attendant came by and gave me an extra bottle of water. I put it in my bag, didn’t think about it, and didn’t open it. I went to my hotel and the next morning I was racing for my flight, and the bag went through. They didn’t catch the bottle of water.

How big was the bottle?

Pretty big!

It happens. I’ve heard all sorts of people saying I left the liquid bag that you’re supposed to take out, they got through. No, it definitely happens. We’ve all had those experiences.

I’m glad they’re testing these guys, and like you said, they’re rotating them. But what gets me is that they’re not inspecting the cargo that’s carried in the baggage hold of the plane that I’m on!

Well that’s true. They’re under mandate by Congress to start doing that in three years.

In how many years?

In three years.

Wow, talk about a reprieve. That’s like a stay of execution from the governor.

Well it’s three years sooner than they would have done it otherwise.

That’s one way of looking at this, but that still doesn’t make it acceptable.

The problem they have with cargo is, how do you inspect it? They come in van-sized components, how do you X-ray it?

I have the answer. You don’t inspect them there, you inspect them at the point where they’re packed. the cargo shipping guys have to have an inspector on hand to do it. What they have now is something called the trusted shipping program, meaning they like you, you pass a background check, and they don’t inspect it. That’s a loophole. That’s huge.

It’s true. The program you just described where they do the inspection at the site is probably what the TSA is going to end up doing.

Well, I certainly hope so. I get angry when I see people being strip-searched for tweezers, and they’re not inspecting the cargo. It’s like they’re doing half the job.

I don’t know of any instances when a cargo bombs have been used.

Oh, I can tell you some, when people at these trusted shipping companies ship themselves.

Stowaways.

They ship themselves on their own containers. They weren’t inspected, what could they have been carrying?

It’s not a bomb.

It’s an intelligent bomb called a human being who could have been carrying anything in there.

No, it’s not a bomb though. A stowaway is not a bomb.

Come on, Tom, you know I’m right here. It’s the potential for a bomb. If I could ship myself inside a container and not get caught, it means everything with me doesn’t get caught. That to me is a potential bomb. I’m going to count to three, you know I’m right.

No, you’re not right.

Why am I not right?

Because there’ s a difference between a human being and a bomb.

Right, a human being is smarter than a bomb and therefore more dangerous than a bomb because they can detonate the bomb.

Whatever.

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